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Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment, we collected data on dictator giving among student
strangers and married couples in a suburban area in the United States. Confirming common belief
and prior empirical evidence, we find that giving among spouses is greater than giving among
anonymous students. We further investigated factors associated with spousal giving which may
provide insight for the development of future theories, or into explaining other-regarding preferences.
Our data shows that giving is positively associated with who manages household money and controls
household income. This result is robust after controlling for each spouse’s personal income and using
various econometric specifications. The results suggest that spousal giving may be due to household
economic roles in addition to other-regarding preferences.
Keywords: dictator game; household economics; spousal giving

1. Introduction
Researchers seeking to understand altruistic behavior and social preferences often use the dictator
game with real monetary payments to elicit realistic behavior in the laboratory [1]. Consistent findings
of positive sharing in the dictator game illustrates a deviation from the expectation of pure
self-interested behavior [2–4]. Explanations of dictator giving has included variations in the context
and setup of the game [5], as well as social distance of the participants [6–8].
Confirming common belief, dictator giving is typically found to be greater among spouses than
with anonymous strangers [9]. Married couples have also demonstrated greater cooperation [10],
trust [11] and reciprocity [12]. However, within-couple differences in giving varies by gender [12,13]
and by knowledge about household finances [13], lending credence to the hypothesis that other
characteristics may influence spousal giving. Broadly, the question remains whether marital giving in a
dictator setting is simply due to other-regarding preferences, such as altruism, perceptions of fairness,
paternalism, or aversion to inequality, or alternatively can be explained by factors or economic roles
within the marriage and household.
Using a laboratory experiment, we collected data on dictator giving among student strangers and
married couples in a suburban area in the United States to conduct an exploratory empirical analysis of
factors that explain differences in spousal dictator giving. Specifically, does spousal giving in a dictator
game depend on demographics, individual preference, or who manages household expenditures?
The results of such analysis may provide suggestions for future research, in particular in formulating
theories and explaining other-regarding preferences.
In our study, we conducted two separate experiments varying the subject pool. In the first round
of experiments, we use anonymous undergraduate college students from Weber State University
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in Ogden, Utah. Later, we ran a public spouse’s game similar to [13] (where spouses are indirectly
informed of their respective spouses decisions if the dictator game is randomly selected for payment,
after which the decision becomes explicit) using married or cohabitating couples living in Ogden,
Utah. We find that sharing among paired strangers is comparable to prior research on dictator giving;
subjects are more benevolent than what would be predicted by models of rational self-interested agents.
By comparison, and not surprisingly, we find statistically higher levels of sharing between spouses,
perhaps suggesting more altruism or notions of fairness among married couples than student strangers.
We also explore whether spousal giving is correlated with who controls household finances,
and whether there are any differences across gender. We found evidence that amounts gifted or
kept are correlated with the spouse that manages household finances, perhaps providing some
evidence that monies are handed over to the person who specializes in maintaining household finances.
This correlation, however, is asymmetric and depends on gender. First, husbands act deferentially by
giving more to their wives if their wives manage household finances. Similarly, husbands will also
keep more for themselves if they are the one who manages the household finances.
Our results provide insight about motivations or purposes of financial transfers made by spouses
in a dictator game setting, suggesting that amounts transferred are related to the roles or tasks that
each spouse has in the household. While we are only able to examine factors that may be correlated
with dictator giving, it is possible that fairness, reciprocity, and any other-regarding preferences are
affected by these roles as well.
2. Experimental Methods
2.1. Stranger Treatment
College students from Weber State University in Ogden, Utah were recruited via ORSEE [14] to
participate in a laboratory experiment that would take between 60 and 90 min. Students were told that
they were guaranteed to earn $10, comprised of $5 for showing up and $5 for participating, and would
earn additional money based on decisions made during the experiment. Eleven experimental sessions
were conducted between October and November of 2015 at Weber State University (WSU). Ten to
twelve students participated in each session, resulting in a sample of 129 total subjects.
Subjects were greeted in a common area before entering the lab. Upon entering the lab, subjects
were directed to a partitioned computer terminal. Once seated, the researchers read aloud standard
rules for participating in the experiment, such as “no talking”, “turn off mobile phones”, “raise your
hand if you need assistance”, etc. The experiment commenced with instructions and a quiz to confirm
understanding before proceeding to the experimental tasks.
The experiment consisted of multiple parts commencing with a standard dictator game and
followed by four sets of convex time budget (CTB) tasks [15]. This paper is the focus of results
from a standard dictator game conducted among anonymous student strangers. Following all
experimental tasks a follow-up questionnaire was administered. The z-Tree [16] software was used for
all experimental tasks. (a complete description of the experiment is available upon request from the
corresponding author).
Before starting the set of incentivized experimental exercises, a researcher went around the
room and asked each subject to draw a numbered card, presented face down, that represented the
identification (ID) number of an another student in the room. The first question in the experiment was
to enter this ID number on the computer screen. This ID number would be the recipient of the dictator
game as well as the other experimental tasks. This method enabled all subjects to serve as anonymous
dictators and recipients. In the dictator game, each subject was asked to decide how much of $10
to keep for him/herself. After subjects had completed all experimental exercises and completed the
questionnaire, a bingo cage was used to randomly select an exercise from the set of all experimental
tasks to determine final earnings for each subject; this means that the dictator game may or may not
have been the chosen exercise for payment. All payments were processed in a private room. If a subject
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received payment because of giving from another participant, the recipient was not told who the giver
was. Our method mirrors the literature on dictator giving between anonymous strangers.
2.2. Spouse Treatment
We recruited married and unmarried cohabiting couples from Ogden, Utah. Recruiting was done
over a two-month period by going door-to-door and placing door hangers for a “family decision study”
on the front doors of homes in a residential community (see Appendix A for the sample door hanger).
Interested households were instructed to send a text message back to us indicating their preferred
session choice for participation. We followed up with each interested household to verify that the
participants were couples who currently live at the same address. Each participant was guaranteed a
$25 completion bonus ($50 per household), and was told additional earnings are possible based on
decisions made during the study, which would take 90 min. Couples were given larger completion
bonuses than students to compensate them for traveling to campus and the opportunity cost of their
time. The literature has found that recipient endowments affect giving [4]. In our experiments, both the
dictator and the recipient had equal endowments. It is possible, however, that differences in the
completion bonuses could influence giving, acting as an income effect that has been found to increase
altruistic giving [17]. Fifteen experimental sessions were conducted between February and April of
2016 at WSU. Six to ten couples participated in each session, resulting in a sample of 188 total subjects,
or 94 pairs of couples completing the study. Each session lasted around 60 to 90 min.
Only one out of 94 couples in our sample was a same-sex marriage. As a result, the sample size for
the category of same-sex couples was not sufficient for statistical analysis. We include their data in the
analysis by coding the higher income person as the “husband”. All results reported below remain the
same whether we drop this couple or not. Henceforth, regardless of marital status and sex orientation,
we will refer to the members of a household as husband and wife.
After checking in with an experimenter, all participants were gathered in one classroom where
each partner was randomly given either a red or blue folder containing an identification number,
a consent form, the experiment instructions and materials, and paperwork for payment purposes.
To ensure common knowledge, the experiment rules and instructions were read aloud (similar to
the student stranger rules) to all participants. Additionally, we gave an overhead presentation of the
experiment and a demonstration of how participants would indicate their choices on an electronic
tablet decision interface. The color-coded folders were used for splitting the couples into separate
rooms: the spouses with the blue folder were asked to gather in a neighboring room. Both rooms,
therefore, could contain a mix of the male and female members, and no single couple would ever
be in the same room. Once everyone was seated, participants in each room proceeded through the
experimental stages at their own pace.
The experiment consisted of several parts like the student experiment; first, there was a standard
dictator game, followed by four sets of individual CTB tasks. Finally a joint CTB task was completed
by both spouses together after being reunited in the same classroom. The standard dictator game is the
focus of this paper. A questionnaire was administered after completion of the dictator game and the
four sets of individual CTB tasks (like the student setting), and a second survey was completed by the
couple together after they had completed their joint CTB task. The individual survey collected data on
demographics and financial experience or knowledge, while the couple, or joint, survey collected data
on joint household financial experience and decision-making power. The results from the standard
dictator game were analyzed using both the individual and joint questionnaires.
Each spouse made their allocation decisions using an Excel Macro program. Like the anonymous
student dictator game each spouse was asked to decide how much of $10 to keep for him/herself.
After subjects had completed all experimental exercises and completed the questionnaires, a bingo
cage was used to randomly select an exercise from all experimental tasks to determine final earnings
for each subject. All experimental payments were processed in a private room. Our method mirrors
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the literature on public giving between spouses [13] because the bingo cage drawing was completed in
the presence of all participants, and upon payment, spouses could deduce their partners’ decisions.
3. Data and Results
3.1. The Data
The individual questionnaires used in the student and spousal settings and following the
experimental tasks elicited information on individual demographics, socioeconomic conditions,
and knowledge about and experience with financial markets. An additional questionnaire was
administered to both spouses who answered the questions together. This joint survey collected
information about household savings decisions, money management, bank accounts (joint account or
not), and information about which spouse controlled household income.
The set of variables with definitions are presented in Table 1. We present the basic statistics of
our student and spouse samples in Table 2. There are some expected differences between students
and married persons. The average age of students was 25.66 years old, versus spouses being just
under 40 years old. The average of the personal income categories (12 categories in total) was lower
for students than is for spouses, placing personal income of students in the range of $5000 to $15,000,
while for each individual spouse the range was $20,000 to $30,000. In terms of financial savings and
loan experience, spouses are more likely to have a retirement account and a mortgage, but students are
more likely to have a savings account. The proportion of students having children is about 22% versus
67% for spouses.
Table 1. Variable names and descriptions.
Variable
GIVEAMOUNT

Data Source a

The amount of $10 a dictator gave to the recipient

Experiment

Age in years

Individual

Personal income by category (1–12), in increments of
$5000 for categories 1–8, $10,000 for categories 9–11,
and capping out at above $70,000 for category 12.

Individual

Dummy variable equaling 1 if subject is a smoker,
zero else.

Individual

Body mass index calculated as kg/m2

Individual

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the subject is saving
for retirement, zero else

Individual

SAVINGS

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the subject has a
savings account, zero else.

Individual

MORTGAGE

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the subject [or a
spouse] has a mortgage, zero else

Individual

MALE

Dummy variable equaling 1 if subject is a male,
zero else

Individual

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the subject has any
children, zero else

Individual

AGE
PERSINCOME

SMOKER
BMI
RETIREMENT

CHILDREN
MARRIEDYRS

Years married (spouse data only)

Joint

SPOUSEMANAGE

Dummy variable equaling 1 if one’s spouse manages
household income, zero else. Base category is joint
management of household income.

Joint

SELFMANAGE

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the dictator, self,
manages household income, zero else. Base category
is joint management of household income.

Joint

Dummy variable equaling 1 if the married couple
has a joint bank account, zero else

Joint

JOINTBANK
a

Description

Data sources include the experimental task, individual questionnaires, or the joint questionnaire answered by
both spouses together.
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Table 2. Basic statistics for students and spouses.
Students (n = 129)

Spouses (n = 188)

Variable

Mean (SD)

Min, Max

Mean (SD)

Min, Max

GIVEAMOUNT
AGE
PERSINCOME
SMOKER
BMI
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS
MORTGAGE
MALE
CHILDREN
MARRIEDYRS
SPOUSEMANAGE
SELFMANAGE
JOINTBANK

3.73 (2.21)
25.66 (8.56)
2.90 (2.74)
0.28 (0.45)
26.03 (7.14)
0.25 (0.43)
0.79 (0.41)
0.53 (0.50)
0.48 (0.50)
0.22 (0.41)
-

0, 10
17, 59
1, 12
0, 1
16.60, 53.90
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
-

5.75 (2.31)
39.66 (12.82)
5.61 (3.75)
0.47 (0.50)
28.19 (5.78)
0.78 (0.42)
0.64 (0.48)
0.84 (0.37)
0.50 (0.50)
0.67 (0.47)
12.54 (10.46)
0.16 (0.37)
0.09 (0.29)
0.83 (0.38)

0, 10
19, 74
1, 12
0, 1
17.97, 47.34
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
1, 52
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1

Responses to the joint survey completed by both spouses together provide information about
household financial decisions. Saving for the future is a common action in our sample of married
couples, and it could occur through educational savings (57%) or retirement plans (77%). Similar to a
Pew study in 2008 [18], wives tend to manage the income more frequently than husbands (19% versus
13%), yet in our sample the majority of households manage income jointly. A large majority of the
couples, 83%, hold a joint bank account.
3.2. Sharing Differences between Students and Spouses
Figure 1a,b show the frequency of allocations (transfers) made by dictators ranging in integer
amounts between $0 (keep all) and $10 (transfer all). Few spouses and students keep the entire
amount for themselves, but the proportion of students keeping the entire $10 is larger than spouses.
Conversely, the proportion of students transferring the entire $10 to another is smaller than spouses.
Among anonymous students, however, we see that a majority of students do indeed share a positive
amount of the $10 endowment, a common finding in the literature.
Table 3 summarizes allocation decisions for students and spouses with corresponding tests of
significance. Not surprisingly, spouses are more likely to transfer a positive amount to their spouse
than students are to an anonymous student (p < 0.001). Spouses on average transfer just over $2
more of the $10 endowment to their spouse than do anonymous students to one another (p < 0.001).
These differences could be the result of other-regarding preferences, differences in game design,1
amount of the completion bonuses, or other socioeconomic factors. For comparison with prior research,
we also investigated whether gender affects the amount transferred to another individual. First we
tested whether the hypothesis that mean allocations for females and males are equal; second, we tested
the hypothesis that the proportion of females and males allocating non-zero amounts to the recipient
would be equal. For both samples, students and spouses, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis
of no difference based on gender (p-values between 0.312 and 0.589).

1

We thank two anonymous referees for calling this to our attention. In the student setting, the pairings were random, and the
recipient may or may have been the dictator’s dictator. In the spouse setting, each spouse was each other’s dictator and
recipient. Furthermore, the spousal recipients had the ability to respond to the gift after the couple left the lab, implying a
multistage game. These differences in game design could affect the amounts transferred.

60

Figure 1a,b show the frequency of allocations (transfers) made by dictators ranging in integer
amounts between $0 (keep all) and $10 (transfer all). Few spouses and students keep the entire
amount for themselves, but the proportion of students keeping the entire $10 is larger than spouses.
Conversely, the proportion of students transferring the entire $10 to another is smaller than spouses.
Among
students, however, we see that a majority of students do indeed share a positive
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Table 3. Allocation of $10 to students and spouses.
Dictator

Dictators with Non-Zero
Allocations (Proportion)

Amount Allocated

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Max

0.83
0.96

0.20
0.38

3.73
5.75

0.19
0.17

$10
$10

Student (n = 129)
Spouse (n = 188)

3.90 a (<0.001)

z-test of proportions
t-test of means

7.78 a (<0.001)
a

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

3.3. Marriage and Money Management
We explored reasons for the transferred amounts made by spouses. Based on the assumption
that a dictator giving between spouses is a financial household decision, we used three
measures from the joint survey on household financial decisions—JOINTBANK, SPOUSEMANAGE,
and SELFMANAGE—to explore if any of these indicators are related to dictator giving. Table 4 presents
the statistical results that test whether joint bank account holders give more than individual bank
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account holders. There appears to be no difference in the proportion of spouses who transfer a positive
amount, the entire amount, or mean allocations based on whether the couple holds a joint account.
Table 4. Allocation of $10, based on JOINTBANK.
Dictators with Non-Zero
Allocations (Proportion)

Dictator

Dictators Who Transfer
All (Proportion)

Amount Allocated

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Max

0.97
0.91

0.01
0.05

0.15
0.25

0.03
0.08

5.74
5.78

0.17
0.53

$10
$10

JOINTBANK = 1
JOINTBANK = 0

1.575 a (0.1152)

z-test of proportions
t-test of means

−1.420 (0.154)
−0.084 a (0.933)

a

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

Table 5 presents the statistical results that test whether the amount transferred to a spouse is
based on the recipient spouse managing household income (SPOUSEMANAGE). A spouse is more
likely to transfer the entire endowment to their partner who manages the household income, yet the
finding of a difference is significant only at the 0.10 level. Mean allocations are statistically different at
the 0.05 level based on who manages the household income. The dictator, on average, will transfer
$6.60 to their spouse if their spouse manages the household income, whereas a dictator will transfer
$5.59, approximately $1 less, to their spouse if their spouse is not solely or primarily responsible
for household income. We explore whether males and females behave similarly when their spouse
manages household income, and present the results in Table 6. We find that the differences in transfers
are driven by husbands.
Table 5. Allocation of $10 based on SPOUSEMANAGE.
Dictators with Non-Zero
Allocations (Proportion)

Dictator

SPOUSEMANAGE = 1
SPOUSEMANAGE = 0

Dictators Who Transfer
All (Proportion)

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Max

1.00
0.95

0.00
0.02

0.27
0.15

0.08
0.03

6.60
5.59

0.42
0.18

$10
$10

1.260 a (0.208)

z-test of proportions
t-test of means

Amount Allocated

1.639 (0.101)
2.218 (0.028)

a

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

Table 6. Allocation of $10 based on SPOUSEMANAGE by gender.
Amount Allocated
By Male

Dictator

SPOUSEMANAGE = 1
SPOUSEMANAGE = 0

Amount Allocated
By Female

Mean

Std. Error

Max

Mean

Std. Error

Max

7.22
5.57

0.53
0.29

$10
$5

5.67
5.61

0.59
0.22

$10
$10

2.526 a (0.013)

t-test of means
a

0.090 (0.928)

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

We next explore how giving varies based on whether the dictator, him or herself, is responsible
for the household income (SELFMANAGE). The results are presented in Table 7. Table 8 presents the
results based on gender. Overall, we find statistical differences in giving based on management of the
household income, with dictators keeping a larger amount of the $10 for themselves if they manage
the household income; again, this result is driven by husbands (Table 8). Although not presented in
Table 8, we also find that husbands are statistically less likely (p = 0.005) to transfer positive amounts
to their spouse if they, the husbands, manage the household income.
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Table 7. Allocation of $10 based on SELFMANAGE.
Dictators with Non-Zero
Allocations (Proportion)

Dictator

SELFMANAGE = 1
SELFMANAGE = 0

Dictators Who Transfer
All (Proportion)

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Mean

Std. Error

Max

0.87
0.97

0.06
0.01

0.20
0.09

0.41
0.29

5.17
5.86

0.55
0.17

$10
$10

−2.687 a (0.007)

z-test of proportions
t-test of means

Amount Allocated

1.89 (0.058)

−1.511 (0.132)
a

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

Table 8. Allocation of $10 based on SELFMANAGE by gender.
Amount Allocated
By Male

Dictator

SELFMANAGE = 1
SELFMANAGE = 0

Amount Allocated
By Female

Mean

Std. Error

Max

Mean

Std. Error

Max

4.83
6.04

1.08
0.26

$10
$10

5.39
5.67

0.59
0.22

$10
$10

1.524 a (0.130)

t-test of means
a

0.529 (0.598)

Test statistic with p-values in parentheses.

Next we conduct probit and tobit regressions. A probit analysis is used to explain 100% transfers
or giving, and a tobit is used to explore the amount transferred, accounting for truncation on both
the upper and lower ends at $0 (transfer nothing) and $10 (transfer all). The results are presented
in Table 9. For parsimony, we only present results of the coefficients for key focus variables or those
that are statistically significant, but the full set of control variables are presented in Table 1. The results
of both the probit and tobit models support our initial finding after controlling for other factors:
dictator giving is positively related to who manages the household income (SPOUSEMANAGE),
and that this finding is driven by males. Referring to the probit models in Table 9, the coefficient
for SPOUSEMANAGE in the male model is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level,
whereas the positive coefficient in the female model is not statistically significant. Further, for males
only, the coefficient on MORTGAGE is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, while for
females only, the coefficients on AGE and SMOKER are negative and statistically significant at the
0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively. The results from the tobit models are similar. Perhaps one of the
most striking results is the lack of statistical significance on the majority of variables across all probit
and tobit models, with exception of SPOUSEMANAGE. The lack of evidence provides a glimpse
into the reasons of giving. On the one hand, the lack of evidence may simply suggest that a set of
unobservables, such as other-regarding preferences, are the main determinant of the giving amount;
however, this lack of evidence is offset by a robust finding that giving is positively associated with
who manages the household income. This result builds on research on financial decisions within the
household such as household bargaining [19,20] and cooperation [12], life insurance purchases [21],
household expenditures allocated to benefit one member or another based on who assumes the role of
the money manager or family financial officer [22].
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Table 9. Probit and tobit results (transferring $10 to spouse).
Probit Models

VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Households

Males

Females

Households

Males

Females

0.0213
(0.0187)
0.3112
(0.3753)
0.0221
(0.0360)
0.8319 *
(0.4811)

−0.0489 *
(0.0283)
−0.8673 ***
(0.3107)
0.0600 **
(0.0288)
−0.0093
(0.4771)

0.0411
(0.0457)
0.2302
(0.7514)
0.0267
(0.0729)
0.5649
(0.7601)

−0.0403
(0.0288)
−1.2227 **
(0.4654)
0.0807+
(0.0467)
−0.1408
(0.6505)

1.0036 **
(0.4141)
0.4455
(0.5415)
−2.5709 *
(1.3866)

0.3513
(0.6542)
0.0864
(0.4467)
−1.3158
(1.1654)

0.0042
(0.0293)
−0.4291
(0.4173)
0.0627
(0.0405)
0.0185
(0.5337)
0.3118
(0.4269)
1.4060 **
(0.6234)
−0.3517
(0.7221)
4.3132 ***
(1.4989)

2.5221 ***
(0.8468)
−0.9483
(1.4791)
4.1975
(2.7278)

0.5544
(0.7936)
−0.3014
(0.7129)
5.5136 ***
(1.5909)

94

94

188

94

94

AGE

0.0035
(0.0156)
SMOKER
−0.1150
(0.2165)
BMI
0.0322
(0.0213)
MORTGAGE
0.2350
(0.3309)
MALE
0.2851
(0.2427)
SPOUSEMANAGE 0.5475 *
(0.3005)
SELFMANAGE
0.3640
(0.3198)
Constant
−2.0478 **
(0.8380)
Observations

Tobit Models

188

Control variables: PERSINCOME, RETIREMENT, SAVINGS, JOINTBANK, CHILDREN, and MARRIEDYRS.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

4. Conclusions
There are several studies that explore the differences in behavior related to trust, other-regarding
preferences, and cooperation between spouses and anonymous strangers. We contribute to this body
of knowledge by comparing dictator giving among anonymous students with giving among spouses
from a suburban area in the United States. Similar to the literature, we found evidence that giving
among spouses is larger than giving among anonymous students.
Additionally, we investigate factors associated with spousal giving, and find statistical evidence
that suggests that giving is positively associated with household money management, specifically with
who controls the household income. Thus, we find that financial roles within the household explain
transferred amounts, yet the result is primarily driven by the husband’s behavior. This result may
suggest that other-regarding preferences only partially explain why spouses give larger amounts to
their spousal recipients than anonymous students; thus, amounts transferred could be due to economic
reasons reflecting financial control within the household.
Author Contributions: T.C.G. and R.R. conceived and designed the experiments; M.K.G., T.C.G., and R.R.
performed the experiment; M.K.G., T.C.G., and R.R. identified hypothesis tests and econometric methods; M.K.G.
analyzed the data; and M.K.G., T.C.G., and R.R. wrote the paper.
Funding: This research would not have been possible without funding from two Hemingway Family Grants at
Weber State University, Ogden, UT 84408.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Author Contributions: T.C.G. and R.R. conceived and designed the experiments; M.K.G., T.C.G., and
R.R. performed the experiment; M.K.G., T.C.G., and R.R. identified hypothesis tests and econometric
methods; M.K.G. analyzed the data; and M.K.G., T.C.G., and R.R. wrote the paper.
Funding: This research would not have been possible without funding from two Hemingway Family
Grants
at Weber
State University, Ogden, UT 84408.
Games 2018,
9, 69
10 of 11
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Appendix A
Appendix A

Figure A1. Content
Content on
on Recruitment
Recruitment Door Hanger.
Figure

References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Kahneman, D.; Knetsch, J.L.; Thaler, R.H. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the
Market. Am. Econ. Rev. 1986, 76, 728–741.
Henrich, J.; Boyd, R.; Bowles, S.; Camerer, C.; Fehr, E.; Gintis, H.; McElreath, R. In Search of Homo
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. Am. Econ. Rev. 2001, 91, 73–78. [CrossRef]
Camerer, C.F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction; Sage: New York, NY, USA, 2003.
Engel, C. Dictator Games: A Meta Study. Exp. Econ. 2011, 14, 583–610. [CrossRef]
Krupka, E.L.; Weber, R.A. Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game
Sharing Vary? J. Eur. Econ. Ass. 2013, 11, 495–524. [CrossRef]
Leider, S.; Rosenblat, T.; Mobius, M.M.; Do, Q.-A. What do we Expect from our Friends? J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.
2010, 8, 120–138. [CrossRef]

Games 2018, 9, 69

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.
22.

11 of 11

Branas-Garza, P.; Cobo-Reyes, R.; Espinosa, M.P.; Jimenez, N.; Kovarik, J.; Ponti, G. Altruism and Social
Integration. Games Econ. Behav. 2010, 69, 249–257. [CrossRef]
Goeree, J.K.; McConnell, M.A.; Mitchell, T.; Tromp, T.; Yariv, L. The 1/d Law of Giving. Am. Econ. J. Microecon.
2010, 2, 183–203. [CrossRef]
Bezu, S.; Holden, S.T. Generosity and Sharing Among Villagers: Do Women Give More? J. Behav. Exp. Econ.
2015, 57, 103–111. [CrossRef]
Iversen, V.; Jackson, C.; Kebede, B.; Munro, A.; Verschoor, A. Do Spouses Realise Cooperative Gains?
Experimental Evidence from Rural Uganda. World Dev. 2011, 39, 569–578. [CrossRef]
Berg, J.D. Trust, Reciprocity and Social History. Games Econ. Behav. 1995, 10, 122–142. [CrossRef]
Castilla, C. Trust and Reciprocity between Spouses in India. Am. Econ. Rev. 2015, 105, 621–624. [CrossRef]
Hoel, J.B. Heterogeneous Households: A within-subject Test of Asymmetric Information between Spouses in
Kenya. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2015, 118, 123–135. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Griener, B. The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0—A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics;
Working Paper Series in Economics 10; Department of Economics, University of Cologne: Cologne, Germany, 2004.
Andreoni, J.; Sprenger, C. Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets. Am. Econ. Rev. 2012, 102,
3333–3356. [CrossRef]
Fischbacher, U. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments. Exp. Econ. 2007, 10, 171–178.
[CrossRef]
Chowdhury, S.M.; Joen, J.Y. Impure Altruism or Inequality Aversion?: An Experimental Investigation Based
on Income Effects. J. Public Econ. 2014, 118, 143–150. [CrossRef]
Pew Research Center Social and Demographic Trends Webpage. Available online: http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2008/09/25/women-call-the-shots-at-home-public-mixed-on-gender-roles-in-jobs/
(accessed on 7 September 2018).
Dasgupta, U.; Mani, S. Only Mine or All Ours: Do Stronger Entitlements Affect Altruistic Choices in the
Household. World Dev. 2015, 67, 363–375. [CrossRef]
Castilla, C. What’s Yours Is Mine, and What’s Mine Is Mine: Bargaining Power and Income Concealing
Between Spouses in India. 2016. Available online: http://pages.vassar.edu/lacdevconf2016/files/2016/08/
Whats-Yours-is-Mind-and-Whats-Mine-is-Mine-Bargaining-Power-and-Income-Concealing-BetweenSpouses-in-India.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2018).
Barnett, A.E.; Stum, M.S. Spousal Decision Making and Long-Term Care Insurance. J. Financ. Counsel.
Plan. Educ. 2013, 24, 5–19.
Ferber, R.L. Husband-Wife Influence in Family Purchasing Behavior. J. Cons. Res. 1974, 1, 43–50. [CrossRef]
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

